

Knowledge and Reality
Modality

Primary Readings

- (!) **Lewis, D.**, 'Possible worlds', in Lewis, D., *Counterfactuals*, CUP (1973), pp. 84-91. (Reprinted in Loux, M., *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings*, Routledge (2001).
- (!) **Kripke, S.**, *Naming and Necessity*, pp.34-53.
- (!) **Stalnaker, R.**, 'Possible worlds', *Nous* 10 (1976), pp.65-75.
- **Chisholm, R.**, 'Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions', *Noûs* 1 (1967), pp. 1-8. (Reprinted in Loux (ed.) *The Possible and The Actual*, Cornell University Press (1979)).
- **Rosen, G.**, 'Modal Fictionalism' *Mind* 99 (1990), pp. 327-354.
- **R. Adams**, 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity', *Journal of Philosophy* 76 (1979), pp. 5-26.
- **Lewis, D.**, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Blackwell (1986).

Background Readings:

- Lowe, J., *A Survey of Metaphysics*, OUP (2002), part II, ch.5-7 (chapter 7 is probably particularly useful).
- Loux, M.J., *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, (Routledge), (1998), ch. 5.

Questions:

- (1) 'John might have done something different'. How should such claims be understood?
- (2) Should claims involving necessity or possibility be explained using the notion of a possible world? If so, what are possible worlds?
- (3) What are the truth-makers for claims about possibility and necessity?
- (4) 'The trouble with explaining necessity in terms of possible worlds is that we don't know which worlds are possible.' Discuss.